Welfare spending and wage coordination are complementary institutions that generate equality. Considering the welfare state as a social insurance device, we show how coordinated wage compression generates support for higher generosity. Considering wage coordination as a structured negotiation framework, we show how welfare generosity fuels wage compression. Together the two mechanisms enforce each other generating an equality multiplier. Using data on OECD countries over the period 1976-2003 we identify a sizeable magnitude of this multiplier. This complementarity of institutions may help explain the diversity across otherwise similar countries in the OECD area. It may also explain why countries cluster around different worlds of welfare capitalism -the Scandinavian model, the Anglo-Saxon model and the Continental model.
Introduction
Egalitarian countries redistribute more than others. With only one third of pre-tax wage inequality of the US, the Scandinavian countries of Denmark, Norway and Sweden have twice as generous welfare spending. This is a stark illustration of a general pattern across OECD countries: The generosity of welfare spending is negatively associated with the inequality of wages before taxes and transfers. Many political economy explanations of welfare spending, however, claim the opposite. For instance, the seminal papers by Romer (1975) , Roberts (1977) , and Meltzer and Richard (1981) all predict that higher pre-tax inequality generates a more generous redistribution in the welfare state.
Contrary to these political economy explanations Figure 1 shows a scatter plot of how the generosity of welfare states relates to pre-tax wage inequality across OECD countries during the period 1976-2002. Some countries have low wage inequality and high welfare generosity, while others have high wage inequality and low welfare generosity. There are also several countries with intermediate levels of both. This paper aims at explaining the pattern between welfare generosity and wage inequality. We focus on the complementarity of political institutions and labor market institutions.
How generous the welfare state is, depends on the outcome of the political competition over voters' support where the interests of voters are shaped by the pre-tax distribution of wages. We claim that more wage compression magnifies the support for generous welfare spending. Thus wage compressing institutions such as coordination of wage setting, increases the support for generous welfare arrangements. How much wages are compressed in the labor market, however, also depends on the the generosity of the welfare state. As weak groups become stronger in the wage negotiation their relative wage is improved. This feedback effect can generate a cumulative process that adds up to a sizeable social multiplier (Glaeser, Sacerdote and Schenkman 2003) .While the the multipliers that Glaeser et.al study relate to how individual behavior depends on aggregate behavior, ours is caused by the complementarity between institutions -between political competition and wage negotiations. We denote it the equality multiplier.
There are two separate links, one from wages to welfare spending and one from welfare spending to wages. To establish the link from wage distribution to welfare generosity we assert that protection against risk is more important as a justification for welfare spending than pure redistribution. Building on Wallerstein (2001, 2003) we focus on welfare spending as social insurance against loss of income due to sickness, unemployment, and old age. To derive the impact of wage inequality on the support for the welfare state, it should be recalled that a mean preserving spread in a ordinary skewed wage distribution implies that the majority of workers become poorer. Thus how higher inequality changes the political support for welfare spending depends to a large extent on how wage earners below the mean react to lower incomes. In line with the insurance logic, higher wage inequality thus easily translates into lower political demand for welfare spending.
It follows that a compressed wage distribution raises the generosity of the welfare state. We show that this prediction is robust to political competition between parties with ideological preferences. If each party trades off its ideological preferences against higher odds of winning the election, it will commit to a program that compromises the interests of the majority of voters. Since parties have different ideologies it matters which party wins the election, but all parties run on a program that is already adjusted to the compressed wage distribution.
The other link goes from wage inequality to welfare generosity. The mechanism is rather straight forward. Weak groups in the labor market simply become stronger in wage negotiations as their fall back position is improved. They are therefore able to command a higher pay. We incorporate this in a well structured bargaining framework that allows for both decentralized and more centralized wage setting. This set-up is meant to capture the important differences in wage setting institutions across countries that we use in our empirical identification strategy.
In all countries unions have a stronger impact on the distribution of relative wages than on the distribution of profits and total wages (Freeman and Medoff 1984, Wallerstein (1999) and Moene and Wallerstein 1997) . Coordination in wage setting changes the logic of wage negotiations as relative wages are to a large extent taken out of union-employer bargaining and placed into union-union bargaining. Since unions follow fairness norms this change strengthens the bargaining position of weak groups in the labor market.
The level of wage coordination determines the units over which such fairness norms are applied. When wages are determined at the firm level, unions affect the distribution of wages within the firm. When wages are set at the industry level, unions affect the distribution of wages across firms within the industry. When wages are set at the national level, unions affect the distribution of wages across firms, industries and occupations throughout the entire Note: Wage dispersion is the relative difference between the 9th decile and the 1st decile of gross hourly wage. Source: mainly OECD, see data appendix. Overall Generosity Index is an index of welfare generosity developed by Lyle Scruggs, University of Connecticut, see data appendix. Countries included: AUS, BEL, CAN, DEN, FIN, FRA, ITA, JAP, NET, NZ, NOR, SWE, SWI, UK, and the US. N=361, Years included:1976 N=361, Years included: -2002 nation.
To test our propositions we use panel data of OECD countries from the period of 1976 to 2003. Since the causality between wage inequality and welfare generosity runs both ways the major empirical challenge is to identify the parameters of two equations: a welfare generosity curve, where welfare spending depends negatively on wage inequality, and a wage inequality curve, where wage dispersion depends negatively on the generosity of the welfare state. Identification of these parameters is obtained using fixed-country effects and instrumental variable methods.
Our model suggests that we may instrument wage inequality by utilizing measures of bargaining coordination, and that we may instrument welfare generosity by utilizing measures of right wing versus left wing orientation of the government. There are two key identifying assumptions. The first is that bargaining coordination does not affect welfare generosity for a given wage inequality and political orientation of the government. The second is that the political orientation of the government does not affect wage inequality for a given welfare generosity and wage bargaining system.
Our empirical findings support our main propositions. Economies with more equal wages before taxes and transfers tend to have more generous social insurance, whereas economies with more unequal wages tend to have less generous social insurance. Institutions and mechanisms that enhances equality in the market place, also strengthens the demand for social insurance. At the same time generous social insurance tend to reduce inequality in the market place. Together the two mechanisms generate a sizeable social multiplier that magnifies external shocks by sixty per cent in the long run.
Our main finding is that accounting for institutional complementarities and social spill-overs is important for the understanding of why some countries are more egalitarian than others. The basic idea is that certain policies, institutions and behaviors fit together and strengthen each other. In the long run, the outcomes may look as if societal arrangements come in packages with different social and economic organization. Esping Andersen's () emphasis of the three worlds of welfare capitalism is one important example of such clustering that we explore further. While Esping Andersen emphasizes welfare state arrangements as more important than wage setting institutions for the clustering of countries and the differences between the three worlds, we find that wage setting institutions play a more essential role for these differences. In this respect our paper complements the study of how labor market arrangements affect the support for the welfare state by Iversen and Soskice (2001) . They focus on how irreversible investments in skills with low degrees of transferability fuel the demand for social insurance against the possible future loss of income. Our paper also connects to the more general discussion of the economic determinants of welfare spending and inequality (see for instance Cameroon 1978, and Lindert (2004) , and of why not all countries have a European style welfare state (Alesina and Glaeser 2001, 2004) .
Generosity of the welfare state
Many economists and political scientists consider the welfare state as a machinery for redistribution (Romer 1975 , Roberts 1977 , Meltzer and Richard 1981 . Pure redistribution, however, are seldom accepted as legitimate policies by most citizens. Policies that, in addition to providing a more fair distribution, cover social demands for which the market fails to provide, are much more likely to be both legitimate and popular. Assumption 1. Protection against risk is more important as a justification for welfare spending than pure redistribution.
The last fifty years seem to confirm this assertion. Protection against risks has been more universally sought and has been more important for the expansion of the welfare state, than pure redistribution of resources (Baldwin 1990 . Barr 1992 . Here we take this view and focus on the insurance logic of welfare spending. In our set-up the welfare state provides social insurance against loss of income due to sickness, unemployment, and old age.
We also like to restrict the discussion to another stylized fact about the support for welfare spending. Throughout we apply Assumption 2. Rich voters prefer lower welfare spending than the poor. This assertion is consistent with what we find in numerous opinion surveys in OECD countries. High wage and salary earners simply prefer lower taxes (and lower welfare benefits) than low wage earners. The reason is most likely that high wage and salary earners are less exposed to risks of income loss than high wage earners, and therefore have a stronger interest in a generous welfare state.
With these two assumptions we consider a society with a number of citizens normalized to 1. We order their earnings according to their position in the wage distribution denoted i. There are m positions and they are numbered such that w 1 ≤ w 2 ≤ ...w i ≤ .... ≤ w m . The share of the work force in position i is n i . Letting (1 − e i ) indicate the risk of loosing ones income in position i, we define
as the average fraction of citizens who are working. Similarly e i denotes the fraction of workers in position i that are employed. The average wage is
We denote by g the generosity of the welfare system. In all welfare systems social insurance is offered on better terms for low wage earners than for high wage earners. We incorporate this by assuming each worker who loses his income obtains welfare benefits equal to g. This is of course a grave simplification, but one that can easily be modified.
1 . The welfare benefits are financed by a constant marginal tax t on total national income (wages plus profits), e i n i p i =ẽP , where p i is the productivity of workers in position i, where P = n i p i is the average productivity in the the economy and wherẽ e is the productivity adjusted employment rateẽ > e (since e i is positively correlated with p i ). We think ofẽP as representing Gdp per capita. The balanced budget equation is
1 In general, some benefits are proportional to present earnings or past contributions; others are not. We could have incorporated this by a given parameter θ ∈ (0, 1] reflecting the composition of welfare spending and the extent to which the poor are offered social insurance on better terms than the rich:
The benefits g (the benefit level to workers with the average wage) of the social insurance scheme are distributed with a fixed component common to all and a variable component that depends on past and present contributions. The fixed component is θg which defines the floor of welfare benefits to people without income. The variable component is proportional to income relative to the mean g (1 − θ) w i /w, implying that here g i is the welfare benefits to a worker in position i in the event of income loss. The higher is θ the more redistributive is the terms of the social insurance scheme. In the presentation we apply the simplifying assumption that θ = 1
Each citizen has an utility function with a constant relative risk aversion µ over consumption
Since the individual risk of income loss must be considered a serious threat to the living conditions of a typical voter, we limit the discussion to cases where citizens have a relatively high degree of risk aversion µ > 1. Inserting c i = (1 − t)w i and t = (1 − e)g/(ẽP ) the preferences of a worker with a wage w i and risk (1 − e i ) is
We find worker i's preferred generosity of the welfare state -his ideal policyfrom the first order condition ∂v i /∂g = 0 which after some rearranging (and utilizing the constant elasticity of the utility function) can be written as
where g i is the ideal policy of voters in position i. In (5) x i depends on the gross income of the voter, relative to the average income P , and his odds (1 − e i )/e i of loosing the income. With the CRRA utility function x i can be expressed as
and we denote it the odds corrected utility ratio. Given the simultaneous distribution of individual wages and risks over the population, we can in principle derive the distribution of the ratio x i over the population. Assumption 2 above, stating that richer voters prefer lower taxes, implies that x i is declining in i.
The voter with the median value x i = x M prefers a value of g that we denote g M , where x M = h (g M ). When wage compression raises the wages below the mean, higher values of w i for given risks e i imply that the value of the odds corrected utility ratio x M goes up. Since h (g) >, this implies that the preferred level of g goes up as well. Hence, with a skewed wage distribution, where the median wage is below the mean, a compression of wage differentials for a given mean wage implies a higher ideal point of welfare spending for a majority of the voters.
Note that wage compression means higher wages for positions below the mean holding the risks of these positions constant. The main intuition behind the result that wage compressing increases welfare spending, is therefore that wage compression makes the majority of voters, the high risk workers, richer and thus induce them to demand better social insurance. Note also that each level of g i is increasing in the average income of the country. From (5) we see that if all wages increase with the same percentage as P , the ideal point of welfare spending of each voter increases with the same percentage as well. Wagner's law, stating (in our case) that higher national income implies a higher welfare spending as a share of Gdp, would only hold in our set-up, as long as higher P simultaneously implies more wage compression.
Political competition
With two parties or blocks -left and right -that differ in their ideologies, median voter results are not directly applicaple. We follow the approach of Whittman () as discussed in Roemer (). The ideology of parties may be based on the interests of members of the parties' core groups. We write these preferences over policy outcomes as v L (g) and v R (g) which are maximized for g = G L for the left party and g = G R for the right. It is natural to assume that the two parties ideologies are located on each side of the ideal point of the median voter:
Each party is willing to compromise somewhat on ideology in order to improve the chances of winning the election. In the language of John Roemer each party is reformist in the sense that it aims at maximizing the expected party utility (V L , V R ). Letting the probability that the left wins when it proposes g L and the right proposes
In our framework unions (and employer associations) do not play a distinct role in the determination of welfare spending. This is not because we think that these interest organizations are not lobbying for welfare policies. They may very well be active, but in a way that obeys their members' welfare state preferences. This is part of the reason why political parties are likely to have a realistic and consistent assessment of their vote shares for different policies.
To find the winning probabilities we need to know who votes for which party for all relevant proposals g L and g R . If each party should propose the median policy g = g M , both would obtain an expected vote share equal to 1/2.
If g L > g R voters with an interest to vote left must have v i (g L ) > v i (g R ) Using again the constant elasticity of the utility function this inequality is equivalent to
where x i is odds corrected utility ratio as defined by (5). Here k (g L , g R ) is the threshold for the left right votes on welfare policies. It is increasing in g L and declining in g R (see appendix).
Denote by F the cumulative distribution of x i in the population. We then have that the expected vote shares are
The actual vote shares, however, may be affected by random events that we capture by applying a variant of probabilistic voting (see Roemer ) . The actual vote share of the left is equal to the expected vote shares s L plus a stochastic error term ε and the actual vote share of the right is the expected vote share s R minus the stochastic term ε. The value of ε has a symmetric distribution around Eε = 0. The actual vote shares are s L + ε and s R − ε. The probability that the left wins is thus
and the probability that the right wins is (1 − p). In the political competition each party is willing to deviate somewhat from its ideal policies as long as the chances of winning go sufficiently up. The trade-offs involved are captured by the first order conditions
Together the two equations define the Nash equilibrium of the policy game. The ideal policy of the median voter is not an equilibrium outcome since, for g R = g M it pays for the left party to deviate from g M by setting a higher level of g. This is so since the marginal ideological gain p∂v L /∂g L is strictly positive. By increasing the level of g L the left party's chance of winning the election declines and ∂p/∂g L < 0. In optimum (with the right guesses on the opponent's policy choice g * R ) the left party chooses g L = g * L > g M such that the marginal reduction in the chance of winning the election times the gain of winning
, just equals the marginal ideological gain of running with a policy closer to the party's ideals. If the ideal policy of the median voter g M reflect a higher level of generosity, due to wage compression, the left party would as a response change its policy in the same direction.
Similarly the right party would deviate from g R = g M by reducing the level of g R in the direction of the party's ideal policy. In optimum (with the right guesses on the opponent's policy choice g * L ) the right party chooses g R = g * R < g M such that the marginal reduction in the chance of winning the election times the gain of winning
, equals the marginal ideological gain of running with a policy closer to the party's ideals.
The discussion so far is summed up in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Wage compression induces a higher level of welfare generosity: The outcome of the political competition is g L > g M > g R , and wage compression induces a new equilibrium (a higher level of g M ) with higher levels of both g L and g R .
There are additional mechanisms that may support the simple mechanism that we have discussed. Smaller wage differentials imply less severe conflicting interests among voters, increasing the social pressure for certain arrangements of common interests and reducing the coordination costs in offering welfare state arrangements that fit the needs of the large majority. Smaller wage differentials also make it easier for each voter to identify himself with the fate of those who have been unlucky, increasing the support for generous welfare arrangements out collective rationality based on social identification.
Wage setting and welfare benefits
Welfare benefits impose an implicit minimum wage ω (g) in the labor market. This implicit minimum wage can be derived from the participation constraint. Assume that the basic preferences are over income and leisure. Let zU (g) indicate the utility of not working z > 1 with an income g, and assume that z = 1 when working. The participation constraint is then
where ω (g) > 0. Thus the generosity of the welfare state establishes a floor which eliminates the lowest wages, and the floor is higher the more generous the welfare state.
We incorporate this within a set-up with heterogenous job productivity. The productivity per worker in position i is denoted p i .
Non-coordinated wage setting Decentralized wage setting is simply modeled as rent sharing where workers' share is denoted α. Hence, in position i each worker obtains
The parameter α can be thought about as the bargaining power of union locals. Local wage setting, however, can result in unequal pay for equal work even without unions as the cost of filling vacancies or of training new workers may endow workers with bargaining power. Empirical work on relative wages in the US, for instance, reveals large interfirm and inter industry wage differentials that cannot be explained by union membership or any other observable characteristics of the job or the workers (Krueger and Summers 1988 , Groshen 1991 , Gibbons and Katz 1992 . We number the jobs such that p 1 ≤ p 2 ≤ ... ≤ p m , and denote by q the position with the highest productivity that is paying the implicit minimum wage ω (g) implying that
Obviously, a higher implicit minimum wage, due to higher welfare generosity g, compresses the wage scale. Average productivity, defined as above, P = n i p i is assumed to be the same across bargaining regimes. Since we basically are concerned with relative wages this is less restrictive than it may seem at first sight. We define π i = p i − w i , and the aggregates are denoted π = n i π i and w = n i w i where π + w = P . Clearly, a higher welfare generosity g raises the average wage w and lowers average profits π.
Coordinated wage setting Coordinated wage negotiations imply that wages to some extent are taken out of local competition and placed into a system of collective decision making. This alters the structure of who negotiates with whom. The basic change is that many union employer bargains are replaced by union union arguing or bargaining. Coordination can be thought of as a system where:
(i) the employers' association negotiate with the union confederation about the average wage (the total wage bill) W = n i W i with bargaining power α on the union side and 1 − α on the employer side. We use capital letters to indicate the outcome of coordination.
(ii) the total wage bill W is distributed between the unions via collective union-union bargaining.
Hence, in our highly structured wage coordination, unions have much more influence over relative wages than employers as union-union bargaining takes over for separate union-employer bargaining. Each union, in the noncoordinated case, is assumed to be equally strong towards their employers (i.e. having the same bargaining power α). This does not imply that each union, in union-union bargaining, is equally strong towards other unions. In union-union bargaining the effective strength β i of each union must be legitimate -based on acceptable principles that can be defended publicly.
The effective strength of each union is therefore likely to be influenced by conceptions of fairness such as equity or equal treatment, equal wages for equal work, rewards according to productivity. These social norms concern relations between workers in different positions. Unions may always apply such fairness norms, but only over their relevant bargaining units. Coordinated wage setting makes these norms more visible and more effective as coordination extends the unit over which they are applied. This is why fairness norms seem to be less important in local union-employer bargaining than in coordinated bargaining.
In the case of a break-down of wage coordination the non-cooperative benchmark works as a fall-back position. There is an expected status quo bias in the sense that there might be delays before the non-cooperative system is in place implying that the value of the fall back positions is diminished by a factor δ < 1.
Applying the generalized Nash bargaining solution we write the Nash product
Here the parameter β i represents union i's strength in union-union bargaining. Below we make clear how these effective strengths reflect bargaining power moderated by fairness norms. We assume
Maximizing N with respect to W i we obtain
Summing over i and utilizing that π + w = P we obtain that the total wage bill in the coordinated case can be written as
To interpret this, recall that the union confederation can guarantee itself the fall back pay-off δw -the first term in (19). The second term in (19) stems from the potential loss equal to δP associated with a possible break down of coordination. The unions obtain their share α of the gain of no breakdown (1 − δ)P . Equation (19)can also be written as W i = w + (1 − δ) (αP − w) which shows that W ≤ w since αP ≤ w. Thus in our set-up wage coordination is associated with wage moderation whenever the implicit minimum wage ω(g) is binding for at least one group in the non-coordinated case. In other words the generosity of the welfare state increases both w and W , but the rise in the coordinated average wage W is less than the rise in the non-coordinated average wage w.
The first order conditions for max N also imply
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Summing over k and dividing by n i we obtain
where β i /n i is the strength per worker of union i. The equation says that the wage level to group i with coordinated wage setting is the value of the fall back position plus a share β i /n i of the total gain to all unions of not letting wage coordination break down. Notice from (21) and (16) 
The wage level to group i with coordinated wage setting is thus greater or equal to a weighted average of the local productivity of the group p i and the total productivity of all groups P . The inequality is strict whenever the outside option is binding in the non-coordinated case.
Let us now move to the determination of β i which is assumed to be a compromise between two fairness principles: (i) similar treatment, implying that the strength per worker tends to be equal across unions, and (ii) reward according to productivity, implying that the strength per worker tends to reflect the contribution measured by the local p i relative to average productivity.
2 We capture the trade-off between these two principles by assuming that the effective strength in union union bargaining is an weighted average of union size and relative local productivity:
r = 1 implies that all weight is placed on the concern for similar treatment and each union is equally strong per member. r = 0 implies that all weight is placed on contribution as reflected in local productivity. Whenever some weight is put on equity r > 0, the wage scale is compressed by coordination. To show this we first consider positions where the implicit minimum wage is not binding. Then
Observe that if the strength of each union is determined only by its local productivity, that is r = 0, wage coordination just reproduces the noncoordinated wage structure. With some weight on similar treatment, however, wage coordination implies that jobs with productivity less than the average, p i < P , obtain a wage rise, while jobs with productivity above average, p i > P , obtain a wage decline. Hence, wage differentials are compressed both from below and above. Consider next positions where the implicit minimum wage is binding in the non-coordinated case, i.e. jobs where αp i < ω(g). In these jobs the coordinated wage is
Hence, W i ≥ ω(g) = w i . Wage coordination leaves the low wage unchanged at its minimum level ω(g), if the weight r on equity is sufficiently low. If the weight on equity is sufficiently high, however, wage coordination implies a rise to
The relative wage between a high productivity job i = H and a (sufficiently) low productivity job i = L, can be written as
This expression can be thought of as a measure of the inequality between two fractals in the wage distribution. Clearly, wage coordination reduces this inequality by lowering the high wage, and in addition either raising the low wage or leaving it unchanged. By putting it somewhat differently, union strength in union-union bargaining, β i , may reflect both political bargaining power (the size of the union n i )) and economic force (the productivity of it's members p i ). The weight r put on political bargaining power, obviously benefit low wage workers. The value of r is likely to be strictly positive since all groups -also the lowest paid -can inflict a cost on the others by not cooperating. The value of r is likely to be strictly less than 1 since economic force easily translates into sharing power.
From the expression of I HL we also see that a higher welfare generosity lowers wage inequality, as low wages before taxes and transfers go up with the generosity g, and high wages remain unchanged. Higher generosity improves the outside option of the workers and therefore leads to a higher implicit minimum wage. This minimum wage can be binding both in the non-coordinated and the coordinated wage structure. If the minimum wage binds in the coordinated case, higher generosity raises low wages directly. If the implicit minimum wage is only binding in the decentralized case, higher generosity improves the bargaining outcome of low paid workers and raise their wages beyond the implicit minimum wage due to an improved fall back position in union-union bargaining.
This discussion is summed up in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 (i) The inequality between high and low wages declines with welfare generosity irrespective of the level of coordination in wage setting and the value of r put on equity in union strength.
(ii) Wage coordination compresses wage differentials between high and low wages: workers in jobs with above average productivity (p i > P )obtain lower wages, while workers in jobs with productivity below the average (p i < P ) obtain higher wages relative to the non-cooperative benchmark.
So far we have focused on extreme cases with and without wage coordination. Intermediate levels of partial coordination are also highly relevant. The implication of intermediate levels of wage coordination can easily be derived from our set-up. We have shown that wage coordination compresses wage differentials over the bargaining area. If the bargaining area does not include all positions, the excluded positions are likely to be remunerated by local systems or sharing rules. This is particularly relevant for some high paid non-union positions, implying that the wage distribution becomes skewed with a thin right tale -and with a median below the mean wage. More generally, compared to the decentralized system intermediate levels of wage coordination unambiguously lead to lower wage inequality whenever the coordination includes positions below and above the mean.
As the fairness norms held by unions become more visible and pronounced the more coordinated the wage setting system, it is tempting to speculate of how the weight r put on equity in itself is affected by the degree of coordination. In highly coordinated wage systems union representatives must publicly defend the relative wages they have negotiated. Thus the pressure on equal treatment may become more severe in highly coordinated systems of wage setting. If this is so, there is an additional channel that strengthen the impact of coordination on wage compression. Yet, whether the weight on equity r depends on the level of coordination or not, the highest level of wage compression is obviously obtained through full coordination.
Finally, it should be noted that the combination of welfare spending and wage coordination within our simple set-up has basic implications for the level of profits -even in the restrictive case of constant employment. As stated, wage coordination implies overall wage moderation whenever the implicit minimum wage imposed by the welfare state is binding for some groups. While, in the non-coordinated case all costs associated with higher implicit minimum wages are borne by employers (as long as employment is constant), more of the costs are borne by the workers with wage coordination. Hence, wage compression implies that more of the cost of welfare spending is levied on workers rather than employers.
4 The (In)equality Multiplier Section 2 established how the level of political support for a generous welfare state is determined by wage inequality. In short the mechanism can be written as g = g (I, z) where I is wage inequality, and z is a vector of exogenous factors. As proposition 1 shows, higher wage inequality lowers the generosity of the welfare state, i.e. ∂g/∂I = g 1 (I, z) < 0. Our model also suggests that the ideological orientation of the winning party should be included in the vector z in addition to the level of gdp per capita and indicators that pick up the economic risks that voters are exposed to -such as economic openness.
Section 3 established the reverse relationship between inequality and the generosity of the welfare state. In short this mechanism can be written as I = f (g, x) where x is a vector of exogenous factors. As proposition 2 shows, higher welfare generosity lowers wage inequality, i.e. ∂I/∂g = f 1 (g, x) < 0. Our model also suggest that the level of coordination in wage-setting should be included among the vector x in addition to the level of gdp per capita and the level of union density.
Combining the two mechanisms an institutional equilibrium can be obtained. The equilibrium is (g * , I * ). Given the level of welfare generosity g * , the wage inequality I * is generated, and for a given wage inequality I * the welfare generosity g * is generated. The two mechanisms generate a consistent pair (g * , I * ) where g * = g (f (g * , x) , z) and I * = f (g * , x). Combining the two mechanisms an institutional equilibrium is obtained. This equilibrium can be reached by gradual adjustments -a long sequence of wage settlements and welfare state adjustments.
The mechanisms contain an equality multiplier between wage setting and welfare spending. The equality multiplier summarizes the feed back mechanisms of the model magnifying any shifts in one of the two curves. The initial shift is then magnified by the multiplier
where the multiplier m is greater than one whenever the system is stable, i.e. f 1 g 1 < 1 It should be noted that the multiplier can go both ways. It may either magnify or mitigate inequality depending on the initial stimuli to the system, constituting either an inequality multiplier or an equality multiplier.
Evidence

Identification
Since the causality between wage inequality I and welfare generosity g runs both ways the major empirical challenge is to identify the parameters of the two equations:
We need some exogenous factors that are included in x and thus affect wage inequality, but do not affect welfare generosity; and some exogenous factors that are included in z and thus affect welfare generosity, but do not affect wage inequality. Our theoretical model suggests that the political color of the government should affect welfare generosity, but not wage inequality, and that the level of wage coordination should affect wage inequality, but not welfare generosity. We will use these restrictions to identify the the slopes of the two curves. Our main identifying assumptions are that conditional on the other explanatory variables and country fixed effects, the impact of unions and employer associations on welfare generosity does not depend on the bargaining system, and similarly that the impact of the government on wage inequality is not through direct intervention.
There are examples that seemingly go against the assumption that government does not affect wage inequality. The Thatcher government, for instance, clearly affected wage inequality in the UK. The way it did this, however, does not contradict our assumptions. The government affected wage inequality by changing the regulations of how unions could operate and how they could recruit members. The effect on wage inequality is therefore indirect through changes in bargaining system and in union density, variables that we do include in the vector x.
Another example is the recent policy changes in Sweden where the right wing government is effectively dismantling the so called Ghent system of unemployment compensation. In the Ghent system unions administer funds for unemployment insurance that are subsidized by the government. Several studies show that union density is higher in countries with the Ghent system (Lesh 2004 , Holmlund and Lundberg 1999 , and Bckerman and Unisitala 2005 . Again the way the government affects wage inequality -recently first in Finland in the 1990s and maybe now in Sweden -do not contradict our assumptions. The possible effects on wage inequality go indirectly through changes in union density, which again is included in the vector x.
There are also examples that seemingly go against the assumption that unions and employer associations do not affect welfare spending. There are lobbying efforts for specific welfare state policies both from union confederations and employer associations. Comprehensive unions are for instance sometimes seen as strong defenders of the welfare state. Their impact on welfare policies, however, are strongest when they lobby for the interests of the majority of the electorate. When they lobby for more special interests, the problem is credible threats and credible promises.
Unions and employer associations cannot guarantee reelection of politicians and governments as they have no control over how votes are cast. This limits their ability to influence social policies systematically against the interests of the electorate. Low density unions have no impact, whereas high density unions within a comprehensive union movement have their own political conflicts over welfare spending that mirror the political conflicts of voters in the electorate.
In general, there is a long European tradition, in particular in the Nordic countries, that the government does not intervene in wage setting which is left to be negotiated by the organizations of the labor market. The principle of non-intervention endorsed by the organized interests in the labor market also limits their ability to affect social policies directly.
These identifying assumptions are used to form instrumental variables in our empirical analysis. Details on the empirical strategy is provided below.
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Data
We use a panel of observations from 18 OECD countries to test key predictions from the model and to quantify the size of the equality multiplier. Our main results are obtained using 359 observations of yearX country cells from the period of 1976-2002. Detailed descriptions of the data are provided in the appendix.
Wage inequality is measured by the relative difference between the 9th decile and the 1st decile of gross hourly earnings. This measure is gross of taxes and transfers, and based on individual outcomes in the labor market. Most of the observations of wage inequality are obtained from OECD (Employment Outlook and Society at a Glance), who reports d9d1 ratios. Wage inequality data are supplemented with observations from two other sources. Details are provided in the appendix. Table 5 
Country
Dataset 1975-1979 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 We find large differences in pre-tax wage inequality across countries. Using Esping Andersen's (1990) country classification 3 of Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, we find an average level of 3.4 for the Liberal countries, 2.9 for the Conservative countries, while the Social Democratic group of countries have an average of 2.3 in our data. Out of the 20 countries, 7 have experienced an increase in wage inequality from the first to the last of the observed 5-year periods, 4 have experienced stability, while 9 countries have experienced a decline in wage inequality.
Generosity of the welfare state is measured by the overall generosity index provided in the Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset, constructed and generously made available for other researchers by Lyle Scruggs at the University of Connecticut. The index captures the generosity of income support in the case of illness, of unemployment and of disability pensions (including old age) of each country year cell. Generosity is constructed using both the replacement ratio, coverage, entitlements and timing of different schemes. As robustness tests, we also provide some figures using alternative measures of the two key outcomes. Figure 2 displays the trend in the overall generosity index as well as in public social welfare spending for each country in our sample. Again we find considerable differences across countries. Averaging the overall generosity index across the country groups gives 21.3 for the Liberal countries, 25.9 for the conservative countries and 36.2 for the Social Democratic countries.
The figure also shows the trend in public social expenditures as reported by the OECD. Public spending is a measure of the outlays associated with any given level of generosity, while the overall generosity index measures the generosity of the system, as reflected in the rules concerning replacement rates, coverage, entitlements, and timing. While spending varies with economic conditions, such as the business cycle, the generosity index varies only as the rules of the system changes. We find, for instance, that both Sweden and Finland experienced a dramatic growth in public spending associated with the economic downturn of the early 1990's in these two countries, while at the same time the generosity index is on a slow decline, reflecting a tightening of the rules of the welfare system. Key variables to provide independent variation in welfare spending are indicators of right versus left wing power in government, obtained from E. Huber et. al. (2004) , Comparative Welfare States Dataset and from Armin- 1980 1990 2000 2010 1980 1990 2000 2010 1980 1990 2000 2010 1980 1990 2000 2010 1980 1990 et al, 2006) . Remaining explanatory variables, such as openness, GDP per capita, the share of the population with tertiary education and the employment rate of the 16-64 population are detailed in the appendix as well.
The negative association between inequality and generosity
Figure 1 in the introduction displayed a negative bivariate association between wage inequality and the overall generosity score. This section checks the robustness of this negative association, using both various measures of inequality and generosity and a simple descriptive regression analysis. To show that the negative relationship found in figure 1 is not just an artifact of our particular measure of wage dispersion, we show in figure 4 plots of our preferred measure of welfare generosity against different measures of wage and income inequality.
In panel a) we use within group wage inequality, measured as the interquartile range between d9 and d1 of conditional wages for men with tertiary education, within the same age group working in private manufacturing 4 . In panel b) we use the wage premium associated with tertiary education estimated from standard Mincer-regressions 5 . In the lower panel we use two different measures of household income from two different sources; Deininger and Squire (1996) and the Luxembourg Income Study.
It seems clear that the negative relationship between wages and generosity is not just an artifact of our particular measure of income. Figure 5 plots our preferred measure of wage inequality against different measures of public welfare spending as well as the three sub-indexes underlying the overall index of welfare generosity. Below each figure a regression coefficient (t-value) for wage dispersion from a model of the generosity measure is also reported. N= 79, Years=1980-2002 ). N=79, Years=1980-2002 Note: Overall Generosity index is the index of welfare generosity developed by Lyle Scruggs, see discussion in the text. The two upper panels show inequality measures calculated from quantile regressions of gross hourly wage, while the two lower panels show inequality measures at the household rather than at the worker level. The b(t) values are coefficients(tvalues) from simple linear regressions of overall generosity against each inequality measure, from models also including year dummies. Note: Wage dispersion is our preferred measure of inequality, mostly derived from OECD sources (see data section). Public spending and Social Transfers are measures of spending relative to GDP, obtained from OECD sources (see data section). The three lower panels provide plots of the three underlying indexes of the overall generosity index; generosity of unemployment benefits, of sicknes benefits and of pensions. (see data section for details). The b(t) values are coefficients(tvalues) from simple linear regressions of each generosity measure against wage inequality, from models also including year dummies.
Again we find a consistent negative pattern between welfare generosity and wage dispersion.
Having established that the negative association between generosity and inequality is not just an artifact of our particular measures, we now turn to a simple regression analysis of our two preferred measures in order to check that the negative association is not just a result of a spurious correlation arising through some other factor. In table 1 we show the results of two regression models estimated on the pooled panel of countries. The first two columns shows that there is an increasing trend in the generosity index, albeit a declining one since the second order term is negative. There is no significant trend in wage inequality 6 . Large countries have higher wage inequality, and a lower level of overall generosity than small ones. The next two columns show results of a seemingly unrelated regression model of each of our endogenous variables. Consider the equation for wage inequality first. Once we introduce controls for the of covariates, we find that the positive association between country size and wage inequality turns into an insignificantly negative one. We find that wage inequality is negatively associated with bargaining coordination and union density, it is positively associated with the share of the population with tertiary education, and negatively associated with the employment rate of the age group 16-64.
Consider next the generosity equation. Once we introduce controls for our covariates, we find that the positive trend in generosity is replaced by an insignificantly negative one. This result is for the most part due to the positive association between national income, gdp and generosity. More open economies have more generous welfare states. Furthermore, we find that generosity is lower when the right party has the majority in government, while there is a positive relationship between the share of left seats in parliament and welfare generosity. Note that the political variables are not collinear, since there is also a center/independent dimension in the data, that acts as a reference category in these models.These results in table 1 are obtained using the pooled data set, and thus a large share of the identification is obtained from cross-country variation. Since there is a lot of unobserved heterogeneity across countries, we have not yet addressed causal effects. One purpose of providing these results is to show that the descriptive patterns of generosity and inequality are reasonably in line with the predictions from the model. A more careful analysis of effects is be provided below. Another purpose of providing the pooled data regressions is to show that the negative relationship between inequality and generosity in the data is not just a result of omitting some common factors, such as country size, openness or gdp. In table 1 we thus report the correlation coefficient between the residuals of the equations. The correlation coefficient is -0.27 and highly significant.
Details on identification
In order to address the problem of large heterogeneity across countries we include fixed country effects in all of our regressions below. In this way all time invariant differences across countries are swept out of the analysis, and identification is obtained from within-country differences only. Some variables, such as populations size, vary very little within each country, and are thus absorbed by the country fixed effects.
In order to address the simultaneity problem of the two equations we are estimating, we use an instrumental variable approach.
(i) In our generosity equation we use bargaining coordination as well as union density, labeled bargaining institutions in the following, as instruments for wage inequality. In addition we include the share of tertiary education and the employment rate in the 16-64 population, labeled workforce composition in the following, as another instrument for wage inequality. The identifying assumption is that bargaining institutions and workforce composition do not influence generosity, conditional on the other variables in the generosity equation (including wage inequality and country fixed effects).
These assumptions are supported by the data: Our preferred models pass over-identification tests with a good margin, and neither of our instruments contribute significantly to the generosity equation when entered one by one.
(ii) In our wage inequality equation we use right wing government, measured as the average number of the last five years that right wing parties had majority (>50 percent) of the government, and the percentage share of elderly in the population as instruments for generosity. This is consistent with our theoretical model that emphasizes how political parties may have an independent influence on generosity. It also turns out that there is a significant trend in generosity, but not in wage inequality, and thus a trend is included among the instruments.
The identifying assumption is that politics, elderly and the trend does not have an independent effect on wage inequality, conditional on the other variables in the wage inequality equation. From our model, the outcome of bargaining is determined by relative outside options, bargaining power and the gains to be shared. These factors are accounted for by such variables like union density, the generosity of the welfare state, and gdp per capita.
These assumptions are also supported by our data. The instruments have a significant and sufficiently strong impact on the instrumented variables. Furthermore, we provide robustness tests below showing that our results do not rely on any specific set of instruments (for instance the trend term in the generosity equation), consistent with our tests of over-identification.
Both gdp per capita and openness appear to have a significant influence on both outcomes, and are thus included as exogenous variables in both equations. This should of course be borne in mind when interpreting the trend variable. Table 2 reports results from fixed country effects models of wage inequality. The first model is a standard fixed effects model. We find an elasticity of wage dispersion of -0.40. The results for bargaining coordination conforms with the results from the pooled model, while the coefficient for union density has changed sign. One interpretation of this result is that, conditional on bargaining coordination, a within country increase in union density most often implies increasing the bargaining influence of white collar groups in the union-union bargaining. Another way of seeing this is to interpret the within effect as a transitory effect of changes in density, while the between coefficient, which is clearly negative since the pooled coefficient of table 1 is significantly negative, measures long term effects of union density on wage inequality.
The Wage Inequality Curve
The remaining models of table 2 are IV-models. The model in column 2 is our preferred IV-model. We find an elasticity of wage inequality with respect to generosity of -0.74. A one percent increase in generosity reduces the wage inequality by three quarters of a percent. The Cragg-Donald statistic clearly indicates that our instruments are not weak, and the Hausman test clearly suggests that the IV-specification is preferable to the fixed effect model.
The Sargan test suggests that our exclusion restrictions are valid, and we also show how robust the results are to inclusion of the different instruments The instruments include right cabinet, share of elderly, and a time trend (with the exception of the included variable in each of models IV2-IV4).
in the generosity equation one by one (Model IV 2 -IV 4). None of the instruments turn out significant in the wage inequality equation, and we note that the estimated elasticity of wage inequality with respect to generosity is not significantly different across these specifications. Note also that the CraggDonald statistic is again satisfactory in all specification, suggesting that we do not have to rely on any of the single instruments to obtain satisfactory identification.
The Generosity Curve. Table 3 provides fixed country effects models of the overall generosity index. Model IV 1 is our preferred specification. We find an elasticity of generosity with respect to wage inequality of -0.54. Of course, this result hinges on the quality of the instruments. Tests of over identification and weakness of instruments are satisfactory, even though the Cragg-Donald value of 6.95 is not very impressive. In models IV 2 -IV 3 we check the robustness of our result. First, the instruments are added to the generosity equation in two blocks. In model IV 2, the share of tertiary and the employment ratio (16-64) are included in the generosity equation. In this specification we use the bargaining variables only: Bargaining coordination and Union density, as instruments for wage dispersion.
Two things are worth noticing. The skills distribution proxies do not enter the generosity equation significantly, and also that the effect of wage dispersion is almost identical when identifying the effects from the bargaining variables only. We also note that the Cragg-Donald F-value of 9.16 is quite satisfactory in this case, implying that our result from model IV 1 is not due to weak instruments. The next column provides the results from the complementary experiment of introducing the bargaining variables into the generosity equation, identifying wage dispersion from the skills-proxies only, with similar results (even though the C-D-value is less good). The last model presents results from a model where the linear trend is replaced by year dummies. We note that the effect of wage dispersion is somewhat reduced, and that the C-D value is somewhat weaker, but otherwise the results remain very similar to those of the preferred equation.
The Equality Multiplier
We have showed how wage equality stimulates the generosity of welfare spending, and how the generosity of welfare spending generates further wage compression. A shift in one of the two curves generates feed-back effects, which again generates further feedbacks, and so on, until the process dies out and reaches a new equilibrium. The initial shift is then magnified by the multiplier which summarizes the feed back mechanisms between welfare generosity and wage equality. Whether it mitigates or magnifies inequalities depends on the initial stimuli. The two curves that we have estimated can be used to calculate the size of this equality multiplier. By combining the two curves we can also test whether the multiplier is significantly greater than one. Table 5 provides estimates of the two preferred models simultaneously, using three stage least square. The three stage least square model estimate the preferred IV models table 3 and 4, taking also the correlation between the residuals of these equations into account. We find that the results conform well with those observed in tables 3 and 4, but that the statistical significance level is improved for several of the variables, such as for instance for right wing government in the generosity equation. The estimated equality multiplier is as large as 1.6, implying that any exogenous change is magnified by 60 percent due to the cumulative impact of the feed back effects. This effect is both statistically and economically significant.
In order to illustrate the order of magnitude of the estimated effects, consider the following thought experiment. Consider a shift in the bargaining coordination index from the UK level of 1.38 to the Norwegian level of 3.86. This implies a negative shift in wage inequality of .125 log points, or from the UK average inequality level of 2.21 to a new level of 1.95. Next the multiplier magnifies the effect by 1.6, leading to a total reduction of .2 log points, or from 2.21 to 1.80. This contra factual change in the bargaining index would also lead to a total increase in welfare generosity by close to .1 log points, or from the UK average of about 20 to 22 on the generosity index.
Consider next the effect of right wing government. A shift from zero to one (a five year period of right majority in government), has a direct effect of a reduction in generosity by .02 log points. Through repercussions via the labor market, the effect on generosity sums up to 0.03 log points. From the Norwegian level of generosity, this change would imply a reduction in welfare generosity from about 40.5 to 39.5. Wage inequality would then increase by 0.023 log points. We note that the differences induced by a change in government are considerably smaller than the differences following a change in bargaining coordination.
Changes in income per capita and openness shifts both curves as well. However, since the direction of the change is the same in both curves, the negative feedback effects tend to dampen the effects of the initial shifts. The impact of a change in wage inequality on generosity is large. Consider an exogenous shift increase in Norwegian wage inequality of .13 log points. This is the change that would be necessary to close the gap between the fixed country effect of Norway and the fixed country effect of US that remains as unexplained in the 3SLS model of table 4. The direct effect of this change is a drop in welfare generosity by 0.06 log points, adding up to a reduction of .1 log points including the the feedbacks. The total effect on wage inequality would be .21 log points. A similar exogenous shift in generosity of -.13 would imply a total increase in wage inequality of .16 log points.
Three Worlds How much of the differences across "Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism" (Esping-Andersen, 1990)are we able to explain by the mechanisms of the equality multiplier? The estimated fixed country effects provide measures of time invariant heterogeneity across countries. The first column of table 5, denoted SUR, indicates the differences across the three groups of countries. It reports the unweighed average of the country effects within each group of countries relative to the overall unweighed average country effects from an estimated model that only controls for gdp, openness and (for generosity) time. We find that the gap between the average level of wage inequality between the liberal countries and the social democratic countries is 0.55 log points,while the similar gap between liberal and social democratic countries in the average generosity index is 0.51 log points.
The second column of table 5 shows the same type of aggregate country effects for the three worlds from the preferred specifications of wage inequality and generosity. We use the aggregate effects from the 3SLS simultaneous equations model provided in table 4. Concerning wage inequality, we find that when conditioning on generosity, bargaining institutions and employment composition, in addition to gdp and openness, the unexplained gap between liberal and social democratic countries drops significantly from 0.55 log points to 0.15 log points. Similarly, the gap between liberal and social democratic countries in terms of generosity, drops from 0.51 to 0.31 log points.
Our estimated mechanisms are thus able to pick up a significant part of the differences in wage inequality and welfare generosity between the three worlds. In particular, it turns out that the feed back effects between labor market institutions and welfare generosity contribute considerably to the differences between the different worlds of welfare capitalism. Number of countries: 18. Instruments for wage dispersion included in the IV specifications are Bargaining coordination, Union density, Share of pop. with tertiary education and the employment pct(16-64). Instruments for generosity included in the IV specifications are Right cabinet, Share of elderly and trend.
Concluding remarks
Inequality reducing institutions in the labor market and in the welfare state are complementary. Each of them strengthens the impact of the other. The sum of these positive feedbacks we label the equality multiplier. The complementarity between wage inequality and social insurance is an important reason why countries tend to cluster into different "worlds of welfare capitalism". The different mechanisms that have been proposed as explanations for the apparent institutional diversity in earlier literature, such as the size of the country, openness, ethnic fictionalization, religious traditions etc. may all contribute to the diversity of institutions. The complementary of institutions and the equality multiplier is however, the key mechanism that drives the worlds apart: Certain institutions "fit together" and others don't. Wage equality and social insurance fits.
Institutions in the labor market and the welfare state evolve over time. Intuitions for the most part develop through gradual reforms. Complementary institutions tend over time to develop in tandem, and as we have demonstrated they may develop into distinct worlds of modern capitalism. Of course, the institutions of modern capitalism also respond to market forces and technological change, changes that now are common to all developed countries. Different institutional set ups may induce different reactions to such changes and shocks. Furthermore, the institutional equilibrium may shift as well. In the same way as the equality multiplier enhances the effect of an income equalizing impulse, it also may lead to an unraveling from an income sensualizing impulse, leading a country away from a wage equalitysocial insurance equisetum. Our conjecture is that it is often unclear in what direction common changes in markets or technology will drive the new institutional equilibria, some changes may enhance convergence while other changes may drive the worlds apart. What is clear is that an analysis of the impact of such changes need to to consider the more general equilibrium effects, both in terms of institutions, politics and markets.
Data sources and definitions
The data set is a panel of OECD countries from 1976 to 2003. The variables we use are collected from different sources.
Wage inequality is measured by the relative log difference between d9 and d1. The data collected are d9/d1 ratios, mainly provided by the OECD. Most of the OECD data are collected from the OECD Employment Outlook, 1996 Outlook, , table 3.1. (1979 Outlook, -1995 and from the OECD Society at a Glance, Social Indicators, 2006 (data EQ2 -earnings dispersion of full time workers, 1990-2003) . Some earlier and completing OECD series has kindly been provided by Guiseppe Bertola (see Bertola, 2005) . Additional series are calculated on the European Community Household Survey-ECHP (1994 -2001 . For the Nordic countries, we have collected additional series from national data sets, obtained from the NOS-S project (see Asplund et al 2007) , covering the period from 1980-2001. In order to minimize measurement errors, an average over all these sources is constructed for each countryxyear cell, so that each countryx year is one observation. In the empirical analysis below, we always include a variable indicating the weight of the different sources (OECD, ECHP, NOS-S) in the construction of each countryx year-cell, as well as a separate trend variable for the ECHP data, in order to account for potential heterogeneity in definitions etc. between the sources. Table A.1 in the appendix provides an overview of the years covered from the different sources. Table 5 below gives a description of the underlying trends in wage inequality, as measured by the d9d1 ratio, by showing five years averages from each country and source.
The generosity of the welfare state is measured by the overall generosity index provided in the Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset, constructed and generously made available for other researchers by Lyle Scruggs at the University of Connecticut. The index captures the generosity of income support in the case of illness, of unemployment and of disability pensions (including old age) of each country year cell. Generosity is constructed using both the replacement ratio, coverage, entitlements and timing of different schemes, in addition to other features of the schemes.The construction of the index is described in Scruggs (2004 Scruggs ( , 2007 . The data set is available at http://sp.uconn.edu/˜scruggs/wp.htm). Figure 2 below compares the trends in overall generosity relative to public social spending as a percentage of GDP as reported by OECD.
The political variables are obtained from E. Huber et. al. (2004) , Com-
